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Summary. — The “One Health” concept refers to an integrative approach of health 
issues, emphasizing the strong interdependencies between human health, animal health 
and environmental health. This approach defends the need for interdisciplinarity, transdis-
ciplinarity, and intersectorality in health risk management. As regards public and animal 
health, the role of economics has often been restricted to an accountancy role, mobilizing 
diversely sophisticated tools to model the cost of diseases, of their control, and of welfare 
systems. However, as a conceptual framework of decision analysis, economics may bring 
a lot more to health risk management. This paper deals with the foundations of a so-called 
socio-economic reasoning, stressing this wider contribution to “One Health” analysis and 
implementation. Referring to recent applications, this article advocates how the socio-
economic framework may constitute an interdisciplinary bridge, linking technical and 
social sciences.
Mots-clés. — Comportement; Bien public; Réseaux; Organisation; Interdisciplinarité.
Résumé. — Le raisonnement socio-économique comme pont interdisciplinaire en matière 
de santé. — Le concept «Une Seule Santé» renvoie à une approche intégrée des questions 
de santé, soulignant les interdépendances étroites entre santé humaine, santé animale et santé 
environnementale. Cette approche met en avant un besoin d’interdisciplinarité, transdisci-
plinarité et intersectorialité dans la gestion des risques sanitaires. En matière de santé 
publique et animale, le rôle de l’économie s’est souvent restreint à un rôle comptable, 
mobilisant des outils de sophistications diverses pour modéliser le coût des maladies, de leur 
contrôle ou des systèmes de santé. Pourtant, en tant que cadre d’analyse de décision, l’éco-
nomie peut contribuer bien plus largement à la gestion des risques sanitaires. Cet article 
décrit les fondements de ce qu’il nomme un raisonnement socio-économique, soulignant 
ainsi cette plus large contribution à l’analyse et la mise en œuvre du concept «Une Seule 
Santé». Se basant sur des applications récentes, cet article tend à défendre un rôle potentiel 
du cadre d’analyse socio-économique comme pont interdisciplinaire, reliant les sciences 
biomédicales, techniques et sociales.
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Trefwoorden. — Gedrag; Algemeen welzijn; Netwerken; Organisatie; Interdiscipli-
nariteit.
Samenvatting. — Socio-economische redenering als een interdisciplinaire brug in 
gezondheid. — Het ⹂One Health”-concept verwijst naar een geïntegreerde benadering van 
gezondheidskwesties, waarbij de nadruk wordt gelegd op de sterke onderlinge afhanke-
lijkheden tussen de gezondheid van de mens, de gezondheid van dieren en de gezondheid 
van het milieu. Deze benadering benadrukt de behoefte aan interdisciplinariteit, transdis-
ciplinariteit en intersectoraliteit bij het beheersen van gezondheidsrisico’s. Op het gebied 
van de volksgezondheid en de diergezondheid is de rol van de economie vaak beperkt tot 
een boekhoudkundige rol, waarbij verschillende verfijningstools zijn ingezet om de kosten 
van ziekten, hun controle- of gezondheidsstelsels te modelleren. Maar als kader voor het 
analyseren van de beslissing kan de economie veel breder bijdragen aan het beheersen 
van gezondheidsrisico's. Dit artikel beschrijft de grondslagen van wat hij socio-economi-
sche redenering noemt, en benadrukt deze bredere bijdrage aan de analyse en implemen-
tatie van het One Health-concept. Op basis van recente aanvragen pleit dit document voor 
een potentiële rol van het sociaal-economische kader als een interdisciplinaire brug tussen 
de biomedische, technische en sociale wetenschappen.
1. Introduction
The “One Health” concept refers to an integrative approach of health issues, 
emphasizing the strong interdependencies between human health and animal 
health within a health ecosystem (Zinsstag et al. 2015a). It is closely related to 
the EcoHealth framework, stressing the same communality of health determin-
ants of life forms on earth. This approach defends the need for inter- or transdis-
ciplinarity and intersectorality in health risk management. The term “interdisci-
plinarity” is here understood as an integration of various scientific disciplines in 
tackling these issues, while the use of the term “transdisciplinarity” aims at 
stressing the crucial role of all stakeholders in solving complex societal issues, 
thus calling for participatory approaches and citizen science (Keune et al. 2013). 
Intersectorality then stresses the need for different sectors in the society to col-
laborate in the management of health risk. This will often refer more precisely 
to interministerial collaborations but without being restricted to this public action 
sphere. 
Over the last two decades, the concept was brought on the forefront as a result 
of the complexity of emblematic health challenges as influenza viruses present-
ing a pandemic potential, haemorrhagic fevers as those caused by the Ebola or 
Lassa viruses, emerging vector-borne diseases as the Rift Valley or West Nile 
fevers, as well as antimicrobial resistance. Due to the zoonotic nature of most of 
the health risks tackled under its umbrella, the “One Health” advocacy keeps 
dominated by the need for interactions between human and veterinary medicines. 
Environmental and social sciences are still poorly integrated in this scientific 
movement (Khan et al. 2018). Nevertheless, the wider understanding of the 
concept as presented here calls for an involvement of many domains linked to 
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health issues, like environmental quality, biodiversity, human behaviour, or 
social, cultural, economic and political evolutions of societies across the world.
Beside this explicit account of human, animal and environmental dimension 
of a given issue, the “One Health” approach may also be centrally defined by the 
complexity it tackles (Zinsstag et al. 2015a, Antoine-Moussiaux et al. 2017). 
Complexity here covers a defined set of features of an issue conceived as a sys-
tem of factors, among which the high number of factors involved with a multi-
tude of interactions, including feedback loops, giving rise to non-linear relations 
between elements and to emergent properties of the whole system, which cannot 
be understood by studying its constituents in isolation (Cilliers et al. 2013). 
Complexity, which is then also marked by its part of unpredictability and uncer-
tainty, calls for a careful definition and investigation of the issue with the support 
of multiple perspectives, hence inter- and transdisciplinarity.
As regards public and animal health, the role of economics has often been 
restricted to an accountancy role, mobilizing diversely sophisticated tools to 
model the cost of diseases and their control, the value of health, insurance cover-
age, welfare systems, health policies (for an example of reviews in animal health, 
see Rich & Perry 2011; for one in public health, see Brouwer et al. 2006). 
More explicitly considered within the framework of the “One Health” approach, 
the role of economics is then proposed, in accordance with this accountancy role, 
to objectify the added value gained from intersectorality, advocating integration 
with stakeholders and plan for cost-sharing schemes (Zinsstag et al. 2015b, 
Machalaba et al. 2017). In fact, a narrow vision of economics associates the 
discipline with the sole micro-economic theory and financial analysis tools to 
defend strategic choices and evaluate the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of 
health actions or programmes (Machalaba et al. 2017). Economics is here 
mainly understood as the science of the optimal allocation of resources, being 
defined according to one of its practical goals, with a normative ambition, i.e. 
defining what is best to do (Rushton 2009, Howe 2017).
Other authors have advocated a wider application of economics to health 
issues and health system analysis, then putting forward the economic insights 
into decision-making rather than a science of “cost-for-value” (Carande-Kulis 
et al. 2007, Antoine-Moussiaux et al. 2017, Wolf 2017). Along with the latter 
view, economics may be described through its means and its basic contribution 
to knowledge, i.e. as a behavioural science studying human decision-making with 
the help of a diversity of theoretical frameworks, sharing a restricted set of com-
mon basic concepts, such as utility. As a conceptual framework of decision 
analysis at different human organizational scales (micro, meso, macro), econom-
ics may bring a lot more to health management than accountancy and a suppos-
edly optimal allocation of resources. At this stage, it is interesting to note how 
recent works in economics of animal health exemplify the use of accountancy 
approaches to understand the actual decision-making of farmers, although the 
tension between a strictly positive approach and a normative one remains at the 
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very heart of such works as in many economic works (Rojo-Gimeno et al. 2016, 
2018a). In fact, since it deals with decision-making, the whole discipline of econ-
omics appears as embedded in a field of tension between positive and normative 
goals. As other sciences, however, it may indicate the way to reach some goals, 
not the goal to be sought, which should remain a social and political issue. The 
use of the term “socio-economic reasoning” aims here at stressing this wider 
contribution, taking account of the economic analysis of the diverse nature of 
motives for decision-making, diverse preferences and relationships between 
indiv iduals and social groups, then bringing the analysis out of the sole monetary 
dimension of decision-making. It widens the scope of explaining factors in stake-
holders’ decision-making, integrating tools from communication, modelling, 
sociology or anthropology to adequately approach actors’ rationality in diverse 
cultural and social contexts. As such, socio-economic reasoning may constitute 
an interdisciplinary bridge, linking biomedical, technical and social approaches, 
as exemplified by the value chain framework (Antoine-Moussiaux et al. 2017). 
This paper provides to a readership from life and health sciences some keys 
about socio-economic reasoning in health, highlighting the bridges to other dis-
ciplines in the prospect of “One Health” approaches. After addressing the foun-
dations of socio-economics and the mainly handled conceptual frameworks, it 
will cover a set of applications to health including methodological considerations 
in relation with the “One Health” concept.
2. Socio-economic Reasoning: From Philosophy to Science, and Back
As already introduced, socio-economic reasoning proposes an analysis of 
decision-making based on the core-concept of utility, a term referring to overall 
welfare people may experience, more precisely as a result of their choices. This 
concept is also the basis of the philosophical view called utilitarianism. Utilit-
arianism is classically considered as founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). It sets the attempt to reach the “greatest good 
for the greatest number” as a criterion for the conduct of public and private 
affairs. Hence, this maxim directly refers to an idea of maximization of utility, 
being considered as a sum of the pain and pleasures one experiences and the sum 
of all these individual utilities to obtain a public utility. This thought may how-
ever be considered as finding its roots in earlier works of David Hume (1711-
1776), who directly influenced Bentham, but also from French philosophers as 
Claude-Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771) or Pierre-Louis de Maupertuis (1698-
1759). While both Helvetius and Hume indeed mobilized the notion of public 
utility, Helvetius brought an interesting case in proposing in De l’Esprit (1758) 
a fundamental analysis of human mind, or ways of thinking and acting, based on 
the notion of self-interest. Let’s recall that the predominance of self-interest in 
analysis does not philosophically exclude altruism as a principle of human 
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behaviour. Altruism is indeed considered through the diverse works of Adam 
Smith (1723-1790), the other major founder of economic thinking, understood 
as this possibility for an optimal public good to be reached through the sum of 
decentralized individual decision-making (Anspach 2008). On another note, the 
works of Maupertuis are recognized as the first explicit occurrence of the idea 
of summing pains and pleasures in an overall calculation, which quite obviously 
finds its roots in the Epicurus’ principle of the calculation of pleasures and pur-
suing pleasure as the final good.
As a matter of fact, much of the works of these philosophers aim at normative 
ethics, while socio-economics as a scientific discipline may be thought as pos it-
ive in nature, aiming at understanding the world and defining ways of action. 
Beside the case of Helvetius, such a scientific framing of utility also appeared in 
the 18th century in the works of Daniel Bernouilli (1700-1782), utility here 
appearing as the objective that people maximize when making decisions, under 
the term of “subjective utility”. Very close to the modern understanding of the 
concept in the part of economics more precisely dealing with individual decision 
analysis, this subjective utility is translated into a function joining factors of dif-
ferent natures which affect human decision-making. Interested in decision-making 
under risk, Bernouilli exposed in his work, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura 
Sortis (1738), how the non-linearity of increase in utility (welfare) with the rise 
of income translates into a concave utility function that directly explains how one 
usually tends to avoid or undervalue risky games (Bernouilli 1954). These 
works may be considered as founding the discipline of economics as a mathemat-
ical study of decision-making.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, although still anchored in the works of 
these founding thinkers, this emerging discipline of economics was further trans-
formed to leave the ground of a moral philosophy and become a mathematized 
expression of choices and their societal results, mostly focusing on production, 
consumption and trade. However, behind an appearance of objectivity and value-
neutrality sought through its mathematization, the philosophical and normative 
background of economics remained strong and has proven a powerful support to 
legitimate a diversity of policies. The normative facet of economics finds present 
application in policy evaluation based on welfare economics. Hence, while the 
utilitarian basis of public health ethics may be tempered by John Rawls’ notion 
of justice protecting individual liberties (Roberts & Reich 2002), the economic 
tools for public decision-making and policy evaluation (ex-ante or ex-post) are 
built on a clearly utilitarian philosophical ground. Even when mobilized in an 
attempt to understand reality, hence with a positive purpose, the philosophical 
foundations of economics should not be forgotten in order to enlighten the use 
of its results or to modify its methods to include other philosophical assumptions.
Today, socio-economic reasoning mobilizes the notion of utility as the motive 
of individual decision-making, which appears as an optimization process of one’s 
own interest (Kahneman & Sugden 2005). However, while neoclassical econ-
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omics considers income, profit or consumption as sufficient measures of utility 
and drivers of decision-making and considers markets as giving a sufficient 
account of interactions between actors, the socio-economic reasoning calls to 
explicitly recognize the importance of a diversity of social interactions and pro-
cesses in shaping individual and collective choices and behaviours, with a par-
ticular attention paid to institutions (particularly in the domains called “institu-
tional economics” and “new institutional economics”). Also, other motives may 
be included in utility functions in an attempt to take account of human behaviour, 
as altruism or status-seeking behaviour (Gaspart & Seki 2003). As a result of 
the definition itself, an individual will be always considered rational since he 
pursues the maximization of his/her utility, notwithstanding its formal definition 
and the factors upon which it rests. However, the rationality considered here is 
limited, or say “bounded”, by access to information, emotions, perceptions and 
cognitive abilities of the decision-maker, as highlighted by the seminal works of 
Herbert Simon, who himself claimed working in the continuity of Alfred Mar-
shall’s idea of economics being a psychological science (Simon 1979). Other 
major authors working along this idea were John Maynard Keynes (Keynes 
1936), who built his well-known macro-economic theory on the “animal spirit” 
of decision-makers, i.e. preferences and fear, but also John Von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), who brought up 
utility in its decisional understanding that is here mobilized, as well as Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who put forward the prospect theory of decision-
making (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The latter works led to the setting of a 
new constituted discipline, called “behavioural economics”, with its peculiar 
application through experimental economics, the popularity of which is now 
growing fast. While both denominations are often used interchangeably, beha-
vioural and experimental economics differ in that the latter represents more 
preci sely the test of the hypotheses of the former, in controlled and reproductible 
experimental settings built up to record and analyse factors influencing indiv-
idual choices. It is interesting here to observe that the Journal of Behavioral 
Economics, created in 1972 and now published under the name of Journal of 
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, has been renamed from 1991 to 2014 
Journal of Socio-Economics, illustrating the present proposition of socio- 
economic reasoning as a positive study of human decision-making. Hence, as 
developed here, socio-economic reasoning offers as much communality with 
research threads as old and new institutional economics, behavioural economics, 
political economy, sociology of organizations, or political ecology. So, the term 
is not aimed here as yet another branding. Rather socio-economic reasoning 
appears as a more general term in an attempt to clarify for a non-economist 
readership the extent to which this approach diverges from the dominant under-
standing of economics as an accountancy discipline studying the optimal alloca-
tion of resources in production, distribution and consumption of goods and ser-
vices, all of which in monetary terms.
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3. Conceptual Frameworks of Socio-economics
3.1. From the Individual to the Society
Starting from the notion of utility and its maximization by the individual, 
socio-economic reasoning builds upon a methodological individualism, i.e. by 
studying decision-making at the level of individuals. However, these individuals 
are not isolated from society and are characterized by their preferences, subject 
to a number of bias, constraints and influences, typically within power relation-
ships. While utility may undergo a mathematical formalization — with prefer-
ences treated as specific functions of a basic good and parameters defining these 
functions —, all these concepts may also operate with a qualitative use to char-
acterize the diverse facets of human behaviour. Risk aversion and time prefer-
ence are major examples of this way of operating. However, other types of pref-
erences are handled, as loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), ambiguity 
aversion (Han et al. 2009) or preference for improving sequence (Loewenstein 
& Prelec 1993, Chapman 2000). Factors driving the decision to or away from 
a particular outcome are called incentives or disincentives, respectively. These 
words are understood here in a broad sense, well beyond the sole glow of recei-
ving money and the prickle of paying. A main concern of socio-economic reason-
ing will then be modelling, quantitatively and/or qualitatively, the structure of 
incentives framing individual decisions to lead up to collective (in-)action 
(Kotani et al. 2014), as also applied to public health (Siegal et al. 2009) and 
animal health (Gramig et al. 2006, Valeeva et al. 2011, Alarcón et al. 2014).
The socio-economic approach of collective action consists in the modelling 
of direct interindividual interactions, as opposed to the neoclassic micro-econ-
omic framework that mainly considers interindividual interactions as solely 
mediated through markets (price being the signal influencing behaviours). For a 
socio-economist, interacting individuals are understood as interacting strategies, 
the outcome of one’s strategy depending on that adopted by the other. This mod-
elling approach is referred to in the wide framework of the theory of games (for 
founding article, see Nash 1951; for application to health, see Bauch & Earn 
2004). This analysis of direct interactions between individual strategies generated 
a range of concepts and models that proved useful in our understanding of dec-
isions of humans in interaction, as are the asymmetry of information, moral 
hazard, adverse selection, within agent-principal relationships and an overall 
theory of contracts or theory of agency (for founding authors, see Akerlof 1970, 
Williamson 1973, Jensen & Meckling 1976).
Considering any actor of a system as a decision-maker, the different scales 
may be addressed by studying the decision-making of individuals operating at 
these different scales, in their different societal roles (Laffont 1999). Classically 
embedded within this methodological individualism, neoclassic economics does 
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not consider emergent preference properties of human groups. This represents a 
limitation in tackling complex systems as health is explicitly handled in the “One 
Health” framework (Zinsstag et al. 2005a), because emergent properties and the 
needed system thinking is a core concept in complexity theory. Therefore, an 
opening to sociological frameworks and system thinking is needed, which is here 
proposed to pertain to a socio-economic reasoning. Hence, networks, stakehold-
ers groups and organizations may be studied as such through adapted tools and 
usefully complement the individual decision-making analysis.
3.2. Collective Action and Individual Freedom
The theory of games finds a famous application in the so-called tragedy of the 
commons, which consists in the overuse of common resources as an inescapable 
result of individual short-term profit maximization strategies (Hardin 1968). 
This tragedy points to the main theme of externalities, i.e. the effect of one’s own 
activity on others’ utility that one will neglect in his/her decision-making. This 
neglect causes an inability of markets to regulate the production of these positive 
or negative consequences, being part of the different forms of the so-called “mar-
ket failures” (in this case, free markets would lead to producing too little of the 
positive externalities and too much of the negative ones). Where markets fail 
other institutions have to intervene in the framing of individuals and the promo-
tion of favourable collective actions. The latter tragedy of the commons is then 
a peculiar outcome of an overall issue of collective action, once stated that no 
cooperation prevails. This issue is framed in economics under the notions of 
public goods and common goods, which are defined according to criteria of non-
rivalry and non-excludability in consumption (Samuelson 1954). The issue is 
thus one of coordination of individual decision-making within institutional set-
tings. Appearing as incentive structures, institutions are the set of rules, informal 
and formal, collectively and gradually established to frame — or govern — 
indiv idual actions within the boundaries of a shared interest, which as a matter 
of fact is of utmost importance in health governance (Siegal et al. 2009). There-
fore, the notions of externalities, common and public good, and governance 
appear central to socio-economic analysis of decision-making. The latter focus 
on institutions and governance has been widely studied in the domain of natural 
resource management, against the idea of tragedy of the commons, with founding 
authors as Elinor Ostrom, who proposed inter alia a multi-tier matrix to analyse 
collective action within socio-ecosystems (Ostrom 2007). Adopting a multi-
agent and multiscale analysis of human behaviour, along a set of categories 
defined around resource use, i.e. resource units and resource systems, users and 
governance systems, interactions and outcomes, this matrix appears as a major 
application in line with the here-proposed understanding of socio-economic rea-
soning. 
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Another major contribution to the thinking of collective action was brought 
by Crozier & Friedberg (1977), who built the strategic actor theory on an 
extensive set of case studies. Born within the tradition of the sociology of organ-
ization and influenced by the notion of bounded rationality, this theory adopts an 
overall framing in accordance with the socio-economic reasoning, i.e. a method-
ological individualism recognizing to the individual action some degree of free-
dom and what may come close to the economic conception of agent opportunism 
(Williamson 1973). Distancing itself from the deterministic analysis of organi-
zation as resulting from technology or contextual variables, this framework 
assumes some degree of contingency and freedom within an incentive frame-
work. Through qualitative approaches, the method aims at deciphering complex 
social situations around the central concept of power, understood as the control 
particular actors may have on uncertainty zones, inside a system of alliances, 
conflicts and negotiations. In a more general way, these foundations refer to a 
wide array of concepts and methods in stakeholder analysis.
A third framework to describe here is that of the capabilities (Sen 1989). Fully 
endorsing the philosophical and ethical dimension of economics, Amartya Sen 
brought up the concept of capabilities as a critique of John Rawl’s vision of 
justice. This term refers to the ability of an individual to achieve valuable goals 
based on available resources. Developing a peculiar terminology (functioning, 
value-objects, evaluative space), Sen indeed set a unique framework to decipher 
individual choices, taking account of physical, environmental or cultural deter-
minants. This approach questions the degrees of freedom an individual enjoys, 
by nature or from institutions, to reach his valued goals, coming close in this to 
Crozier and Friedberg’s posture. The capability concept is of particular interest 
in tackling health issues and well-being (Sen 2004), with health potentially hold-
ing diverse roles in the framework: a valued goal, a capability to transform 
resources, a resource by itself. Handling together public, animal and environmen-
tal health in this framework is of further interest as it helps conceptualize the 
relations between those compartments in reaching equity, then endorsing an 
ethical and normative prospect.
This brief presentation of major frameworks and concepts that qualify socio-
economic reasoning may already indicate to the reader how, oscillating between 
mathematical and conceptual modelling, between ethical considerations and 
positive decryption of reality, socio-economic reasoning constitutes a bridge 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches, between technical and social 
science, between individual and collective analyses, and maybe between phi-
losophy and science. The rest of this paper will focus on its application to health 
and in particular how it may contribute to an integrated management of risks 
posed to health.
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4. (One) Health and Socio-economics
Once defined as a discipline studying human decision-making and organiza-
tions, socio-economics may be thought as being pervasive in health issues. In 
fact, from the side of causes, the role of human behaviour and organizations in 
determining the health of individuals and populations is obvious. One will for 
example, starting from the perspective of the individuals, consider the so-called 
“risky behaviours” that tend to expose each to health risk factors. Others will 
start from a societal perspective and consider “health determinants”, i.e. how 
societal organization affects the overall health risk posed to all or part of its 
members, through e.g. poverty, pollution or food production. This oscillation or 
conciliation between deterministic considerations and freedom of actions appears 
as an important feature of a socio-economic reasoning, then calling for complem-
entary methodologies. At the intersection between the two perspectives, one can 
study the organization of health services, the determinants of access to those and 
the use made by people of these services, around the notions of behavioural dri-
vers, incentives and resource use in a multilevel systemic approach (for issues 
analysis, see Ellen et al. 2018, Paul et al. 2018). Then, from the side of con-
sequences, the many impacts of health issues depending on human decision-
making and organizations may be understood — thus not only quantified — with 
the contribution of socio-economic tools and frameworks. So, the scope of 
applica tion appears wide, and actually out of reach of cost-benefit analysis or 
market equilibrium models.
The “One Health” concept may seem to widen even more the perspective, 
adding to human health issues, animal health and environmental issues. However, 
the scope remains seemingly the same: one will question human decision-making 
and organization about causes and consequences around health issues, then more 
actively aiming to take human, animal and environmental dimensions into 
account. Socio-economics, as all social sciences, will then hold a role of binding 
agent inside interdisciplinary approaches joining medical doctors, veterinarians, 
agronomists, and environmental scientists, by providing frameworks to inves-
tigate how human behaviour and organizations constitute one of the drivers and 
links between all these dimensions of one same issue.
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of how diverse approaches per-
taining to what may be called a socio-economic reasoning intervene in the anal-
ysis of health drivers at different levels of human societies.
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Fig. 1. — Socio-economic reasoning in the understanding of health drivers in humans, animals and 
their environment. Health appears as the result of the interaction between humans, animals and their 
environment, which may be considered in its diverse constituents: social, economic, biophysical, and 
natural. The socio-economic reasoning, as developed within a range of disciplines, allows studying 
these interactions as a result of human decision-making and behaviour at different levels: individual, 
groups and networks and the whole society. The list of approaches is not meant as exhaustive.
5. Frameworks and Tools
5.1. Mixed Approaches: Qualitative and Quantitative
As mentioned earlier, socio-economic reasoning rests on both quantitative and 
qualitative data. When used in combination on a same topic, the approach is said 
to be mixed, with a whole range of possible repartitions of respective roles of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches within the study and interactions between 
the two datasets (Palinkas et al. 2011). It may be useful here to comment on the 
notions of quantitative and qualitative data. In fact, in studying decision-making, 
two types of data may be pointed as showing distinct natures though both are 
quantitative. Hence, one could count behaviours and/or measure suspected out-
comes or drivers of those, with a statistical approach aiming at an inference about 
the populational level. On another note, surveys may be designed to learn about 
the trade-offs people make when deciding, then quantifying (rather than “measur-
ing”) elements without a reality outside of the framework that led to their defin-
ition. This is the case of stated preference methods. These methods cover a range 
of survey-based tools to analyse statistically the choices stated by interviewees 
facing virtual alternatives characterized by distinct qualities. Such methods thus 
appear as a tool to investigate people’s preferences for goods or services for which 
no market transactions may be observed. Those are increasingly used in animal 
and public health economics (Sadique et al. 2013, Pham et al. 2017) and have 











1994). In several cases, these values may be considered as quantitative expres-
sion of a basically qualitative enquiry, then aiming at providing a quantified 
expression of individual preferences (Pham et al. 2017). Similarly, other quan-
tities, with the typical case of prices, will be measured with an aim of under-
standing the local case and possible mathematical modelling of it, but without 
any aim of statistical inference on the wider population to which the “sample” 
belongs. In the case of prices, the aim might be to link an analysis of pricing with 
the organization of the system (Tindano et al. 2017).
Like many other social sciences, socio-economic reasoning will build upon 
in-depth analyses of case studies, understood as occasions to confront theory 
with reality and enrich or improve the theoretical thinking (Flyvbjerg 2006), as 
exemplified by the building of major socio-economic frameworks (Crozier & 
Friedberg 1977, Ostrom 2007). The objectives are then to derive basic logics 
and strategies of actors, preferences and expectations, which as conceptual tools 
may be deemed appropriate or not to analyse other contexts, without claiming at 
universal validity. Being interested in human decision-making, socio-economic 
analysis is highly dependent on cultural diversity, various cultures providing an 
opportunity to investigate different rationalities. Clearly, this proposition is at 
odds with a widely shared understanding of economics as putting forward a 
single rationality for the so-called Homo œconomicus.
Socio-economic analysis of health issues may also adopt a more strictly quan-
titative approach within epidemiological studies. Socio-economic data are then 
gathered to distinguish between categories of populations and analyse these cat-
egories as a risk factor for a particular health outcome (Galobardes et al. 
2006a,b; Howe et al. 2012). The question at stake is one of social inequality, to 
be objectified to allow for actions, but also to raise the issues of the behaviours 
explaining the observed difference in risk through socio-economic models of the 
rationality at play (Contoyannis & Jones 2004, van Kippersluis & Galama 
2014).
5.2. Health as a Common or Public Good
The notion of externality has been mentioned here above as part of the cen-
tral conceptual framework of socio-economic reasoning. Briefly stated, exter-
nalities arise when one does not take their effects on others’ well-being into 
account in his decision-making. Since these effects may be either positive or 
negative, externalities may be termed positive or negative. Public and common 
goods are matters of externalities. The public good is the one that benefits to 
all, without a possibility to exclude anyone from its consumption (criterion of 
non-excludability) and without competition between individuals for its use (cri-
terion of non-rivalry in consumption). Most often, the problem is that public 
goods are not produced because potential producers do not take the positive 
externalities of their action into account, hence not facing due incentives to 
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produce it (Hennessy 2017). The common good is one to which a group of 
individuals have an open access (non-excludability) but the consumption of the 
ones will impede or at least affect the consumption of others (rivalry). Most 
often, the problem is that the common goods are overexploited because users 
do not take the negative externalities of their action into account (Hardin 
1968).
Whether health is a public or common good is an interesting question, to be 
answered depending on the precise health issue at stake. Communicable disease 
eradication is a clear matter of public good production, since all will benefit from 
the absence of the disease, without any exclusion or rivalry. Other cases may 
appear less clear. Let us consider transmissible diseases that one’s practices (vac-
cination, prophylaxis, biosecurity measures, …) may favour or not. Whether one 
looks at health-protecting behaviours as a production of “public” safety through 
positive externalities, or at detrimental behaviours as producing negative exter-
nalities gradually affecting the “common” system’s equilibrium is a matter of 
framing. Hence, vaccination or biosecurity measures will be tackled under the 
scope of positive externalities and the production of a public good (Hennessy 
2008, 2017; Vietri et al. 2012; Ibuka et al. 2014), while the emergency selling 
of diseased birds upon avian influenza outbreak may be analysed under the scope 
of negative externalities (Delabouglise et al. 2016). Similarly, the efficacy of 
antibiotics may be seen as a common good that one’s (mis- or over-) use will 
directly affect through the selection of resistant bacteria, which will then be 
understood as negative externalities (Leal et al. 2017).
The framing of health issues within the concepts of public or common good 
draws our attention to the structure of incentives of individual decision-making 
and the conditions of collective actions. Regarding the first track of research, 
bio-economic mathematical modelling has proven a fruitful tool to analyse such 
issues and gain insights for policy-making or other institutional actions (Hen-
nessy 2008, Althouse et al. 2010, Gramig & Horan 2011). The second aspect 
is more particularly explored within the “One Health” framework, based on 
Ostrom’s notion of socio-ecosystems to analyse the governance of the commons 
(Binot et al. 2015).
5.3. Disease Impact: What did You Expect?
The notion of externality directly invites us to consider the effects of health 
issues beyond the sole accountancy of monetary impacts. In fact, there is a par-
ticular interest, within a complexity framework, to analyse the feedback loops of 
these effects on behaviours (Gramig et al. 2010). Hence, the impact of diseases 
or of actions aimed at their control will be of interest to understand how they 
further influence the issue, leading to possible perverse effects or collateral dam-
ages to be foreseen and taken into account in policy-making. The impacts are 
then seen from the viewpoint of actors’ expectations, which may be wrong or 
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partially true. Expectations, together with preferences, are the basis of the mod-
elling of individual behaviours and may be an important lever for policy-making 
(Nyborg et al. 2016).
A concrete example may be drawn here from avian flu management in Viet-
nam. It is a well-known fact that animal diseases affect market prices, through 
mortality that affects the supply side and the reaction of consumers that affects 
the demand side. This has often been studied through market equilibrium models, 
in order to estimate a total cost of diseases and evaluate policy options. While 
the actual result of these dynamics of supply and demand may be uncertain, 
animal keepers formulate expectations, driving their decision. Hence, in Vietnam, 
in case of outbreaks of avian influenza, farmers said that they expect prices to 
first drop and then rise (Delabouglise et al. 2016). This motivates them to 
eliminate the on-going batch of broilers at the time of the outbreak, in order to 
launch new batches of broilers that will be ready when the prices are higher. 
Also, the same authors have shown that the effect of disease information on 
prices is also anticipated and manipulated by traders, who tend to take advantage 
of outbreaks to generate value added based on their bargaining advantage facing 
the affected farmers. These examples of speculative behaviours will affect the 
epidemiological dynamics as well as markets (Delabouglise et al. 2017). Those 
should be understood if actions are to be taken to control avian influenza with 
the assistance of all stakeholders. Beside prices, the impact of control measures 
is subject to expectations. Stamping out holds a great role in this regard. This has 
been illustrated in the context of pig raising in Vietnam, where it was shown as 
a crucial disincentive for disease notification, apart from monetary aspects of 
this, hence standing beyond reach of compensation policies (Pham et al. 2017).
5.4. Analysing Preferences of Actors
To understand the role that incentives will play on decision-making, one needs 
to understand individuals’ preferences. This investigation falls within the scope 
of experimental economics. Basically, these methods all put individuals in situa-
tions of decision-making to observe their behaviour and derive mathematically 
preferences based on a hypothetic utility function (Brent et al. 2017). As already 
mentioned, the preferences under scrutiny may be diverse, with main cases being 
risk, ambiguity, and loss aversions. Risk aversion may be defined as the extent 
to tendency of individuals to prefer sure outcomes to those subject to a probabil-
istic distribution (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). Ambiguity aversion 
covers the preference of situations with known probabilities of outcomes (then 
termed “risks”) to unknown probabilities (then termed “uncertainty”) (Epstein 
1999). Loss aversion refers to the pre-eminence in individuals’ decision-making 
of not losing a good to that of gaining an equivalent good (Kahneman & Tver-
sky 1979). Quite obviously, all these preferences are relevant to health matters, 
epidemiology documenting probabilities and severity of risks, complex health 
— 53 —
“risks” meaning high uncertainties (and even scientific controversies), and all 
health issues amounting to a feared loss of our well-being.
The use of pesticides by farmers, which is an issue typically handled under 
the “One Health” or “EcoHealth” approach, illustrates how these preferences 
may be measured or handled to account for decision-making impacted by and 
impacting health risks (Liu & Huang 2013). Studying the case of Chinese cotton 
farmers, the paper highlights how different preferences end up in different uses 
of pesticides, linking risk aversion to a higher use of those and loss aversion to 
a lesser use. Risk is here considered as the risk of poor harvest, while loss is 
interpreted as adverse health effects of pesticides. Regarding ambiguity, it may 
be interesting here to mention that it is also studied in medical decision-making 
with psychometric methods, highlighting the role of ambiguity aversion in the 
use one makes of controversial information (Han et al. 2009, Carpenter et al. 
2016). 
The centrality of these three preferences in socio-economic analysis does not 
preclude other preferences to be studied, as status seeking (Gaspart & Seki 
2003), fear of bearing the responsibility for adverse effects on the community 
(Delabouglise et al. 2016), the rejection of culturally unacceptable actions 
(Pham et al. 2017).
5.5. Analysing Networks and Organizations
The study of networks and organizations is needed to understand the place of 
individual decision-making in the overall effect on a particular health issue in 
society. Diverse frameworks are mobilized to analyse organizations, referring e.g. 
to organization sociology or institutional economics. In the context of health 
issues, the reference to systems and system thinking will also be put forward, with 
direct reference to complexity theory (Adam & de Savigny 2012, Antoine-
Moussiaux et al. 2017), as already well established in public health and prom oted 
by WHO (de Savigny & Adam 2009) and more recently developed in animal 
health (Rich et al. 2017, Rojo-Gimeno et al. 2018b). Again, an interesting point 
to be made with respect to the aim of this paper is the complementarity between 
qualitative and mathematical modelling approaches to tackle these systems and 
contribute to a socio-economic analysis of health issues. We have already men-
tioned important frameworks of a qualitative analysis of systems, mainly consist-
ing of systematic grids to analyse situations, as proposed by several authors for 
natural resource management (Ostrom 2007), agricultural innova tion (Lampri-
nopoulou et al. 2014), which are important sources of inspiration for the emer-
ging “One Health” approach. From the side of mathematical modelling, among 
the several methods available, we may stress the cases of system dynamics (Rich 
et al. 2017) and agent-based modelling (Badham et al. 2018).
Being part of the system thinking and again covering a range of diverse 
metho dologies, stakeholder analysis has been similarly promoted in public health 
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(Schmeer 1999, Brugha & Varvasovszky 2000) and is now gaining popularity 
in the analysis of complex health issues for “One Health” implementation 
(Mazet et al. 2014, Kimani et al. 2016). Stakeholder analysis methods include 
qualitative systematic grids aiming at a classification of stakeholders according 
to their relation to the issue, e.g. whether they have or not influential or dec-
isional power, whether they are in agreement or not with a particular action, the 
distribution of roles and responsibilities, interactions between them (Namazzi et 
al. 2013). This approach is of particular interest in analysing intersectorality, 
which is a central feature in the implementation of the “One Health” principles 
(Bordier et al. 2018, Galière et al. 2019). Those interactions between stake-
holders may also be mathematically modelled using the social network analysis. 
Based on the theory of graphs, this method analyses the relative importance and 
roles of actors within a network. Within a “One Health” framework, the method-
ology appears of growing interest (Delabouglise et al. 2015, Kimani et al. 
2016).
The value chain appears as a peculiar type of network, conceived around a 
specific product. This term refers to the full set of actors, their mode of interac-
tion, activities, and flows involved in the provision of a good or service on a 
market. Livestock or game animals value chains are of great importance in the 
implementation of a “One Health” approach, most directly for zoonotic concerns, 
food safety and control of antimicrobial resistance (Antoine-Moussiaux et al. 
2017). However, this classic framework of socio-economic analysis may be 
applied to a wider range of issues impacting public and environmental health. As 
in the overall socio-economic thinking, the concept of governance is central in 
the value chain analysis, aiming at understanding the link between agreements 
and interactions between actors and the overall effect of this organization on a 
health issue. A recent case study of biosecurity in the poultry sector in Indonesia 
is particularly illustrative of this facet of the approach, rather directed to an 
understanding of actors’ behaviour rather than the global value production of the 
chain (Indrawan et al. 2018). Other application may help illustrate how the 
approach may be mobilized for an in-depth analysis of risk management along 
a value chain (Delabouglise et al. 2015) or for a more operational contribution 
to health risk management (Alarcón et al. 2017).
6. Conclusion
The present overview assumes that considering economics as a behavioural 
science could help make clear the usefulness of this domain within an interdisci-
plinary approach as required by the “One Health” concept. Going beyond the sole 
accountancy role of economics, it tends to promote its use in the scientific prospect 
of understanding the world rather than in a normative prospect, i.e. setting both 
the goals to be pursued and the optimal allocation of resources to reach these goals. 
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As presented here, the socio-economic reasoning may be summari zed through its 
primary sourcing in a methodological individualism, on which it builds an attempt 
to study decision-making at different scales, through the analysis of networks and 
organizations. An important feature is the recognition of the wide diversity of 
rationalities of actors and the need to understand those beyond the sole monetary 
factor, through both qualitative and quantitative studies, both conceptual and math-
ematical modelling. The following concepts are proposed here to constitute the 
backbone of the socio-economic framework one needs to understand in order to 
grasp the domain’s contribution: utility, preferences, network effects and system 
thinking, externalities, governance and collective action. Finally, it can be observed 
that the array of literature mobilized here to exemplify the proposal is drawn from 
the different constitutive compartments of the “One Health” or “EcoHealth” issues: 
public, animal, and environmental health, inclu ding agriculture and natural 
resource management. This is to highlight the tremendous gains to be drawn from 
cross-fertilization between the various ways socio-economic reasoning has been 
developed by practitioners in these distinct areas of research. Hence, while the 
“One Health” implementation should benefit from the socio-economic reasoning, 
socio-economics is also expected to gain coherence and be enriched through the 
implementation of the “One Health” concept.
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